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We explore the empirical relationship between borrowing constraints and household
financial portfolio allocation. To motivate our analysis we develop a mean-variance
model of portfolio allocation with three tradable asset classes defined by increasing
risk, and establish a link between borrowing restrictions and financial portfolio allo-
cation at the household level. Under non-restrictive assumptions the proportion of
wealth allocated to the medium-risk asset is ambiguous. We also demonstrate that in
the presence of both correlated background risk and borrowing constraints the domain
of the non-binding risk-return space will be a function of background risk. We then
analyse the US Survey of Consumer Finances with a view to empirically exploring
the predictions of our theoretical framework. The distribution of medium-risk assets
in US households is remarkably similar to that for high-risk assets, and suggests the
presence of a more general ‘risk puzzle’, which our proxies for borrowing constraints
partially explain. Our findings indicate that such constraints are inversely related to
the proportion of financial wealth allocated to both high-risk and medium-risk assets,
but are positively related to low-risk asset holdings. In light of our findings, further
work aimed at accounting for the allocation of medium-risk assets in US households is
considered expedient.
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1 Introduction
The borrowing constraints faced by governments, firms, and households can play a signif-
icant role in shaping economic behaviour and influencing economic outcomes, both at the
microeconomic and macroeconomic level. Significantly, the presence of such constraints has
been shown to hold implications for the sustainability of government deficits (Wilcox 1989),
the behavior of output and prices (Scheinkman and Weiss 1986), and consumption behavior
(Carroll 2001). Borrowing constraints have also been shown to affect the composition of
a household’s financial portfolio (see, for instance: Haliassos and Hassapis 1999; Bucciol,
Miniaci, and Pastorello 2017; and Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese 1996).
Using data from the United States Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) from 1995 to
2019, this contribution investigates the role that borrowing constraints play in determining
the composition of US households’ financial portfolios. From a public policy perspective,
investigating this type of relationship is not just of academic interest. Since the early 1990s,
the United States has witnessed increased efforts to provide additional borrowing oppor-
tunities for households that were traditionally constrained by credit markets (Lyons 2003).
The effectiveness of such efforts takes on additional significance when considered against
the backdrop of a more recent report published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(Hamdani et al. 2019), which found that for the fourth quarter of 2018, over sixty million
US adults were unlikely to access credit at choice, and noted “...wide heterogeneity of credit
conditions at the state and county levels in America” (Hamdani et al. 2019, p.12).1 Given
the high incidence of borrowing-constrained US households that persists to this day, explor-
ing the extent to which access to borrowing affects household portfolios is thus particularly
apposite.2
1These authors also report that the number of Americans who cannot easily access loans may be twice
as many as previously estimated, when people who cannot easily qualify for loans because of blemishes in
their credit histories are taken into account.
2This is of course, notwithstanding the detrimental effect that the inability to borrow plays in exacerbating
social inequalities, and its implications for household consumption smoothing.
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To motivate our empirical analysis, we initially develop a model of portfolio choice with
three tradable financial assets and non-tradable background wealth within a mean-variance
expected utility maximization framework. Our model, in which households face short-selling
constraints as in Jappelli, Julliard, and Pagano (2010), provides a useful starting point
for our subsequent empirical analysis by establishing a link between borrowing constraints,
background risk, and asset allocation at the household level. A notable feature of our
theoretical framework is that we explicitly model the behavior of a medium-risk asset class,
which is motivated by the existing literature’s taxonomy of a household’s financial assets
into three distinct risk-based categories: low-risk ; medium-risk ; and high-risk.3 Whereas our
theoretical model often has clear behavioural implications for the optimal allocation of the
household’s low-risk and high-risk assets, the implied behavior of the medium-risk asset is
more nuanced. Numerical predictions of our model using plausible values of the first and
second moments of our three asset categories, are indicative of lower levels of risk aversion
being associated with higher shares of both medium-risk and high-risk assets. Support for
this finding is found in our ensuing econometric analysis. Our numerical exercise also suggests
that when modelling the impact of borrowing constraints empirically, it is appropriate to
account for the possible presence of background risk.
The emphasis placed on asset shares in our theoretical model is reflected in our economet-
ric strategy, in which the impact of borrowing constraints on our three empirically observable
asset shares is directly estimated. Specifically, we use the ordered fractional model (hereafter
‘OF’) model of Kawasaki and Lichtenberg (2014), which enables us to impose an inherent
ordering on the fraction of assets held in each risk category. This estimation approach con-
trasts with the majority of contributions, where the propensity to hold only a single asset
type is modelled using, for example, censored or fractional regression techniques (see inter
alia, Cardak and Wilkins 2009, Rosen and Wu 2004, and Edwards 2008). We thus consider
3See for instance Carroll (2002) and Hurd (2002). Our motivating theoretical model may have impli-
cations for other empirical contributions where financial portfolios are treated as being comprised of low,
medium, and high-risk assets. From an empirical perspective, many asset management companies describe
the portfolio structure of their investment products using this taxonomy.
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the impact of borrowing constraints on household financial risk taking in a broader sense,
which extends beyond accounting for the propensity of households to directly invest in stocks.
In doing so we build on contributions to the ‘stockholding puzzle’ literature in which assets
are categorised as being either ‘safe’ or ‘risky’ (see for instance: Fratantoni 2001; Haliassos
and Bertaut 1995; Bertaut 1998) and explore the extent to which an avoidance of stockhold-
ing is part of a more general ‘risk puzzle’ that characterises household portfolio allocation.
Here, exploring the determinants of medium-risk asset holding is of particular interest given
that this asset class is classified as including retirement funds and life insurance policies.
Holding such financial products may help to avoid shortfalls in retirement income, or shield
household members’ from catastrophic financial shocks – such as the inability to maintain
mortgage payments due to the death of a breadwinner. In this regard, the consequences of
shunning medium-risk assets may in practice be far more damaging to households than not
directly holding stocks. We now turn to the literature.
2 Literature
Our contribution builds on an established empirical literature, of which notable early con-
tributions include Jappelli (1990), Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles (1998) and Haliassos and
Michaelides (2003). Jappelli (1990) exploits information contained in the 1983 SCF to con-
struct a liquidity constraint measure based on whether the household has been rejected for
a request for credit from a financial institution. The study explores the type of households
who are credit constrained and finds race, wealth, income and family composition all impact
on the probability of being constrained. Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles (1998) exploit data
from both the SCF and the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and
use a two-stage two-sample least squares approach. Using information in the SCF, liquidity
constraint measures are constructed; these measures are used to impute the probability of
liquidity constraints in the PSID data in order to estimate Euler equations. Haliassos and
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Michaelides (2003) theoretically explore the household portfolio allocations in the presence
of liquidity constraints. The authors study an infinite-horizon model of household portfolio
allocation under liquidity constraints to explore the portfolio specialisation puzzle, and re-
port that relatively small fixed stock market entry costs are sufficient to deter households
from participating in the stock market.
More recent studies that are related to our contribution include Carroll, Holm, and Kim-
ball (2021), Toussaint-Comeau (2021) and Insler, Compton, and Schmitt (2016). Carroll,
Holm, and Kimball (2021) explore the interactions between precautionary saving and liq-
uidity constraints in a theoretical setting, where they allow liquidity constraints and risk
to influence consumption concavity. The results suggest that the introduction of risks or
liquidity constraints influences the concavity of the consumption function, in turn, changing
the precautionary saving motive. Moreover, their results show that the effect of introducing
an additional constraint or risk on precautionary saving depends on whether it is correlated
with pre-existing constraints or risks. Dependent on how an additional constraint interacts
with existing constraints, it may serve to reduce the precautionary motive in earlier periods
at some levels of wealth. In addition, Toussaint-Comeau (2021) aims to ascertain how liq-
uidity constraints affect the propensity to save for a range reasons. Analysing the US SCF,
the results suggest that liquidity constraints influence a range of saving decisions, and the
effects of liquidity constraints are amplified by high-debt payments and high-interest-rate
credit cards and serve to hinder savings. In a related study, Insler, Compton, and Schmitt
(2016) explore the consumption and investment behaviour of a unique sample of borrowers
that are not selected based on their credit history. The paper explores survey data relating
to students at the US Naval Academy, given that these individuals have the opportunity to
take a Career Starter Loan (CSL); these are significant personal loans offered at low interest
rates to all students. As a result, these young adults are not bound by liquidity constraints,
which are usually experienced by individuals in this age range. Overall, cognitive ability,
those with prior investment experience and those who view themselves as financially literate,
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on average, invest more and in riskier options.
In exploring the role of credit constraints, our study also controls for the impact of (risky)
background wealth on portfolio allocation.4 Significantly, Canner, Mankiw, and Weil (1997,
p.188) note that, “Human capital – in the form of future labor earnings – is probably the most
important non-traded asset”.5 In this setting, Bertaut (1998) and Haliassos and Bertaut
(1995) find that labour income risk is inversely related to holding risky assets. Related
work by Fratantoni (2001) reports that in addition to labour income risk, expenditure risk
associated with housing has an inverse relationship with household stock holding. Koo (1998)
finds that investors will take a smaller fraction of risky assets in their portfolio when they
have liquidity constraints and uninsurable income risk. Heaton and Lucas (2000) calibrate
labour income risk with personal income data, finding that both labour income risk and the
positive correlation between labour income and risky asset returns tend to reduce investments
in risky assets. We incorporate some of these features into our motivating theoretical model.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3 presents the theoretical
framework which links household borrowing constraints and portfolio allocation. Section 4
outlines the data analysed and Section 5 presents the empirical modelling strategy. Section 6
discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 7 concludes. To help motivate our empirical
analysis, we now turn to a simple model of household portfolio allocation.
3 Theoretical motivation
To motivate our empirical analysis, we develop a model which has a basis in the work
of Markowitz (1952), and is a variant of Eichner and Wagener (2012), who analyse risk-
taking behaviour in a linear portfolio selection problem with non-tradable background wealth.
4As argued below, the exogenous and directly uninsurable nature of background risk amounts to the
assumption of incomplete markets. The presence of such risk can lead a decision-maker to “reduce exposure
to another risk even if the two risks are statistically independent” (Kimball 1992), a concept described as
‘temperance’ (Kimball 1991). For related theoretical contributions see Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987), Kimball
(1991), Gollier and Pratt (1996), and Heaton and Lucas (2000)
5Canner, Mankiw, and Weil (1997) explore portfolio allocation among cash, bonds, and stocks, with a
view to reconciling the household stockholding puzzle in light of the financial advice received by households.
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Assume that households face a linear portfolio choice problem such that the final wealth of
a household is given by
W = qLL+ qMM + qHH + λB, (1)
where L, M and H are random variables representing the return from allocating all of wealth
to these tradable assets, which are defined as being low-risk (L), medium-risk (M), or high-
risk (H).6 The three tradable assets are assumed to be increasing in risk and return, and
capture the structure of US households’ financial portfolios as defined in the existing litera-
ture, see for example, Carroll (2002) and Hurd (2002), where financial assets are classified as
one of three distinct risk-based categories. The weights that households choose to allocate
to these assets are denoted qi, i ∈ {L,M,H}, such that Σqi = 1.7 B denotes non-tradable
background wealth which can be viewed as the ‘stream of household income arising due to
labour or entrepreneurial activity, human capital, and government transfers’ (Eichner and
Wagener 2012, p.424).
An exogenous parameter λ ≥ 0 is used to scale background wealth B up or down; the
non-negativity constraint on background wealth reflects the fact that households cannot
easily borrow against their human capital in the way they can against financial assets.8
Our model is also characterised by restrictions on short-selling which lead to the portfolio
weights of the household’s tradable assets being subject to non-negativity constraints. This
entails that the individual asset shares are characterised by 0 ≤ qL, qM , qH ≤ 1. Although
short-selling is potentially attractive for households – it markedly increases the total return
of a portfolio albeit at the cost of a greatly increased risk – the presence of constraints on
6Although ‘safe’ instruments such as government bonds may be riskless in nominal terms, inflation means
that their return may be uncertain in real terms.
7Eichner and Wagener (2012) consider the case of two tradable assets whose weights sum to unity. We
extend this approach to the case of three tradable assets. Unlike our contribution, Eichner and Wagener
(2012) do not consider the impact of short-sale constraints on the tradable assets, which in the context of
our contribution, are an important model feature.
8Whilst this admits a natural, albeit simplistic, interpretation as a borrowing constraint, Kaplow (1994,
p.1505) notes that: ‘Individuals’ ability to borrow against human capital is limited, but some such borrowing
occurs’. For instance, residential mortgages are based in part on predictions of future earnings; further, in
the United States, the largest student loans are available to law and medical school students, due to the high
and stable expected future income stream associated with jobs in the legal and medical professions.
7
this form of borrowing is a highly plausible assumption in the context of household finance.9
Households are unlike institutional investors, in that the former cannot fund stock market
investments through borrowing from financial intermediaries such as banks. Here, Perraudin
and Sorensen (2000) suggest that in the context of US households, it is highly unlikely that
the majority of households are characterised by optimal, unconstrained portfolios, which
involve short-selling stocks; similarly, Poterba (2002, p.141) notes that the assumption of
short-selling is “...probably not appropriate for a large set of households”.10
The expected return on total wealth, W , is given by
µW = qLµL + qMµM + qHµH + λµB (2)















+2qLqMCov(L,M) + 2qLqHCov(L,H) + 2qMqHCov(M,H)












ρY ZσY σZ = σY Z , such that
√
υi = σi, i = Y, Z denotes the standard deviation of a variable,
σY Z = Cov(Y, Z) is the covariance, and −1 ≤ ρY Z ≤ 1. Given space constaints, and to
facilitate a more focussed analysis of the interplay between background risk and borrowing
9Restricting the portfolio selection by only having positive weights of the assets limits the amounts of
possible portfolios and introduces complexity that cannot be handled by closed-form mathematics, and
requires computation of the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
10In the context of Italian households, Jappelli, Julliard, and Pagano (2010) also suggest that whereas in-
stitutional investors are able to borrow at low-risk to invest in high-risk assets with a greater expected return,
households cannot act the same way, for example by funding stock market investments through borrowing
from financial intermediaries such as banks. Using household data, the authors show that explicitly consid-
ering the no short-selling constraint helps significantly in reconciling individual portfolio choices with the
efficient ones implied by financial theory (Markowitz 1952). Borrowing constraints which prevent households
from short-selling are also explored in Bucciol, Miniaci, and Pastorello (2017), who also develop a model
of household portfolio choice with borrowing restrictions in a mean-variance expected utility maximization
framework.
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constraints, our subsequent analysis permits background wealth B to be correlated with
L, M , and H, but we assume that the tradable assets are not correlated with each other.
Although this does not detract from the main thrust of our analysis, it requires setting
ρLM = ρLH = ρMH = 0.
Now suppose the household specifies µW ; by the efficient set theorem (Markowitz 1952)
it sets out to minimize the variance of wealth, υW . Appendix A derives the efficient frontier
and asset share allocations consistent with portfolio variance minimization, from which we
make the following claim:
Claim 1 In the absence of short-sale constraints, the optimal shares of the tradable assets













M , and q
∗
H denote the variance minimizing shares for low, medium and high-risk
assets.
Proof. See Appendix A.
That is, on the efficient frontier, a higher expected portfolio return µW is associated with
an increase (decrease) in the share of assets in the high-risk (low-risk) category. Significantly,
equation (4) shows that for the medium-risk asset, the direction of this effect on q∗M is
ambiguous. From an empirical perspective, this finding is of interest: even in a simple
tractable framework like ours, the conditions governing the behaviour of the medium risk




S 0 iff υL
υH
T (µL − µM)
2
[
(µL − µH) (µM − µH)− (µM − µH)2
] . (5)
It is straightforward to verify that the condition in expression (5) also holds in the presence
of independent background risk when the tradable assets are not correlated with each other.
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The results in Appendix A also imply that independent background risk has no impact on the
composition of the minimum variance portfolio on the efficient frontier, a finding consistent
with Lusk and Coble (2008) and Jiang, Ma, and An (2010).11 This finding is overturned
when the assumption of independent background risk is relaxed.12 Moreover, Appendix A
also demonstrates that under correlated background risk the q∗i , i = L,M ,H are all linear
functions of background risk, σB. This finding enables us to make the following claim:
Claim 2 In the presence of both correlated background risk and short-sale constraints q∗L ≥ 0,
q∗M ≥ 0, and q∗H ≥ 0, the domain of the non-binding risk-return space will also be a function
of background risk.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As a prelude to our econometric analysis, and to explore the implications of the above
results for US households, it is informative to conduct simple numerical experiments. This
approach aligns with Jappelli, Julliard, and Pagano (2010), who construct an efficient fron-
tier for Italian households both with and without short-sale constraints based on historical
returns data, although unlike our contribution, the impact of background risk is not con-
sidered.13 We also note here that as our low-risk category includes wealth held in savings
accounts, the short-sale constraint in this category could be interpreted as a more con-
ventional borrowing constraint in which the household is not permitted to hold negative
11Jiang, Ma, and An (2010) also explore the impact of background risk on the efficient frontier, and
similarly find that an increase in background risk will shift the frontier to the right. Unlike our contribution,
however, these authors do not focus on the implications of shifts in the frontier on household welfare or the
optimal composition of a household’s portfolio given mean-variance preferences.
12As is standard in financial portfolio theory our interest is with the part of the efficient frontier in the




W , where µ
g
W denotes the value of µW at the global minimum portfolio and
µ∗W is a value of µW on the efficient fronter, as captured by expression (A.6) in Appendix A. A discussion of
µgW is provided in Appendix C. An important corollary of the results in expressions (4) and (5) is that whilst
in an unconstrained setting, increasing risk aversion is associated with a decrease (increase) in the share of
assets in the high-risk (low-risk) category, for the medium-risk asset share qM , the effect will be ambiguous.
Under certain conditions, risk-loving households may hold a smaller share of their wealth in medium risk
assets relative to risk-averse households.
13Although our empirical examples are highly stylised and tied to an explicit formal model, similarities in
the profiles of the efficient frontiers for US and Italian households can be observed. See Figure 2 in Jappelli,
Julliard, and Pagano (2010), and the associated discussion.
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balances.14
Figure 1 plots efficiency frontiers in the µW–σW space, and demonstrates how the presence
of correlated background risk can exacerbate the impact of short-sale conditions by further
restricting the domain of the non-binding return-risk space available to households.15 For
the tradable assets, we choose parameterisations based on historical data for the annualised
returns and volatility of the S&P 500 (‘high-risk’), the Bloomberg Barclays Municipal Bond
Index (‘medium-risk’), and average effective fed funds rate (‘low-risk’), for the years 1995-
2019, which matches the sample period used in our empirical analysis.16 Although these
proxies are arguably crude, they tentatively capture the differences in the nature of returns
and volatilities associated with the SCF asset categories, which are discussed in more detail
in Section 3. Our parameterisations are: µL = 2.36, σL = 2.25; µM = 5.43, σM = 4.96; and
µH = 11.89, σH = 18.44. For background wealth B we set µB = 4 and λ = 1, and consider
two scenarios: one without background risk (σH = 0); and another where background risk
is assumed to be positively correlated with the high-risk asset (σB = 5, ρLB = ρMB = 0,
ρHB = 0.4). Using expression (5) our parameterisations imply that ∂q
∗
M/∂µW > 0, which
entails that lower levels of risk aversion (and hence a higher µW ) will be associated with a
higher share of medium-risk assets.
To explore how background risk may affect the composition of the household’s opti-
mal portfolio, we assume that household preferences are given by the mean-variance utility
function
G(µW , υW ) = µW − γυW , (6)
14In practice, prohibitively high overdraft charges may act as an impediment to sustaining a negative
balance for a considerable period of time.
15We stress here that in the presence of a short-sale constraint, the non-binding return-risk space available
to households satisfying q∗L ≥ 0, q∗M ≥ 0, and q∗H ≥ 0 may be limited, even when background risk is
independent of the tradable assets. Under independent background risk, neither the optimal asset allocations
associated with different points on the efficient frontier nor the regions of the non-binding risk-return space
are functions of background risk.
16Interest rates in US checking and savings accounts are closely tied to the fed funds rate, which is set
by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Using expression (5) our parameterisations imply that
∂q∗M/∂µW > 0, which entails that lower levels of risk aversion (and hence a higher µW ) will be associated
with a higher share of medium-risk assets, as well as high-risk assets.
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where γ > 0 is a risk aversion parameter such that greater values imply lower levels of risk
tolerance, and set γ = 0.5.17,18 Curves corresponding to the case of no background risk are
labelled using a ‘*’ (orange / red lines), whereas under positively correlated background
risk, ‘**’ is used (light blue / dark blue lines). The dashed lines show the unconstrained
efficient frontiers under each scenario, and the thicker solid lines in red / dark blue capture
the impact of the corresponding binding constraints on the respective frontiers.19 Table 1
reports the corresponding optimal asset allocations and the effects on household welfare.
In the absence of background risk (σB = 0), the tangency point of household preferences
with the efficient frontier corresponds to an optimal portfolio allocation spread across all
three assets. Introducing background risk has the effect of shifting the efficient frontier to the
right,20 and when B is positively correlated with H (ρHB = 0.4), holdings of high-risk assets
fall to zero and holdings of L and M rise. Of special interest here is the impact of correlated
background risk on the model’s binding constraints. Figure 1 shows that in the absence of
background risk, the most risk averse households are not subject to binding constraints: for
instance, at the global minimum, the optimal asset allocation is q∗L = 0.819, q
∗
M = 0.169, and
q∗H = 0.012. As in Jappelli, Julliard, and Pagano (2010), risk-loving households suffer the
greatest welfare loss due to the presence of binding constraints (solid red line),21 and risk-
averse households are unaffected. This finding contrasts with the case of ρHB = 0.4, where
unlike in Jappelli, Julliard, and Pagano (2010), the introduction of correlated background
17Our choice of mean-variance utility is commonplace in standard financial economics texts (Bailey 2005),
and is appealing due to its analytical tractability. In our empirical analysis, we use measures of risk attitudes
to capture a household’s attitude towards risk. We stress here that these measures only proxy for risk
preferences, and may not be tightly linked to the shape of a household’s utility function.
18Preference functions for which households are decreasingly absolute risk averse (DARA) do not lead to
tractable results, and require solving by linear quadratic programming techniques. The expected log utility
function given by E(U(W )) = lnµW − υW /2µ2W , where W denotes wealth, would fall into this class of
function (see Pulley 1993, eqn (2), p.686 and the corresponding discussion for further details).
19The extent to which a change in σB impacts on the value of µ
∗
W at the point of tangency is provided in
Appendix D, as is the corresponding impact of a change in risk-aversion γ. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for
our model are set out in Appendix E.
20This effect arises irrespective of the nature of correlation between background risk and the tradable
assets.
21Although not shown in Figure 1, the constraint becomes binding at approximately γ = 0.0761. Under
background risk, the constraint becomes binding at approximately γ = 0.0688.
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risk entails that the most risk averse households will also suffer welfare loss due to binding
constraints coming into effect. Under positive correlation of the form ρHB = 0.4 the point
of tangency between the unconstrained efficient frontier and household preferences shown
in Figure 1 is infeasible due to q∗H < 0, and the optimal allocation associated with the
constrained frontier is associated with zero holdings of high-risk assets.22 Households situated
at both ends of the risk aversion spectrum are observed to be impacted by binding constraints.
Table 1 also reports the results under our model parameterizations of scenarios that
are not depicted in Figure 1, namely the cases of independent background risk, and, of
negative correlation, where ρHB = −0.4. In the former case, the optimal portfolio allocation
is identical to that under no background risk, albeit household welfare is markedly lower.
Significantly, Table 1 shows that the presence of background risk reduces household welfare
relative to the zero background risk case. Under ρHB = −0.4, households are characterised
by riskier portfolios in that a much higher (lower) proportion of wealth is held in the form
of high-risk (low-risk) assets.
More generally, the findings reported above are consistent with Arrondel and Calvo-
Pardo (2002) who find that “...the sign and magnitude of the correlation may exacer-
bate or counterbalance the optimal portfolio response to the introduction of a background
risk.”Notwithstanding our focus on the behaviour of the medium-risk asset, the confluence of
borrowing constraints with background risk holds non-negligible ramifications for portfolio
allocation in US households. As US households are subject to short-sale constraints in prac-
tice (Perraudin and Sorensen 2000, Poterba 2002), this suggests that when econometrically
modelling the determinants of household portfolio selection, controlling for the potential ef-
fects of background risk is advisable. In this regard, our results align with a wider literature
(e.g., Heaton and Lucas 2000) which predicts that the dual presence of borrowing constraints
and background risk will affect household portfolio selection. We now turn to our empirical
contribution.
22Under independent background risk an increase in σB will, ceteris paribus, reduce household welfare.
The composition of the household’s optimal portfolio will be identical to the no background risk case.
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4 Data
The US SCF has been used extensively in the existing literature relating to household fi-
nances, see for example, Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Browning and Lusardi (1996), Bertaut
(1998), Spaenjers and Spira (2015), and Fulford (2015), amongst many others. The SCF is a
repeated cross-sectional triennial survey of US households conducted on behalf of the Federal
Reserve System’s Board of Governors. We exploit data from the 1995 − 2019 waves of the
SCF.23
The SCF contains detailed information on household assets and liabilities, in addition to
a range of income, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. It is notable for contain-
ing household level information on a wide range of financial assets including: transaction
accounts; certificates of deposit; bonds; stocks; pooled investment funds; and retirement
funds amongst others. This feature permits us to explore the household’s portfolio alloca-
tion decisions. To do so, we allocate assets into three distinct risk-based categories: high-risk;
medium-risk; and low-risk. This taxonomy corresponds closely to those used in the contri-
butions of Carroll (2002) and Hurd (2002). In line with the existing literature, we construct
a measure of high-risk assets that comprises of both direct and indirect risky asset holding,
through for example, retirement accounts. Low-risk assets include, for example, checking
accounts and certificates of deposit, while medium-risk assets include for example, non-risky
pension accounts, tax mutual funds and tax free bonds. Full descriptions of these asset
classes are presented in Table 2.24 As is standard in the empirical literature, we explore the
ratio of these asset classes to total financial wealth in the household, that is the proportion
23Given the high rate of non-response associated with micro-data relating to wealth information, the SCF
provides five imputations which give a distribution of outcomes. These multiple imputations increase the
efficiency of the estimation, whilst also providing uncertainty surrounding the imputed values. Our summary
statistics are based on taking the average of the corresponding five implicates for each cross-section. However,
the econometric estimates are based on implementing the repeated imputation inference (RII) method, as
described by Little and Rubin (1987), Rubin (1987) and Montalto and Sung (1996). The RII uses the average
of the coefficients across the five imputations and adjusts the corresponding standard errors accordingly.
24We have also conducted the analysis where high-risk assets are defined to be those directly held by the
household. Generally, the results are consistent with those presented in this paper.
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of financial wealth allocated to each asset class.
In our empirical specifications, we control for a wide range of demographic and socioeco-
nomic characteristics which are based on the existing literature. These include: age; gender;
race; children present in the household; education and labour market status. We also control
for measures capturing risk attitudes, income (and wider economic) expectations in the com-
ing years, home ownership and the household’s saving horizon. A full description of these
variables and corresponding summary statistics are provided in Table 2.
Moreover, in line with our theoretical motivation, we control for a set of variables which
capture the household’s exposure to a range of background risks. These draw on the existing
literature and include risks associated with income, health, expenditure, business ownership,
wealth shocks associated with future inheritance and whether there are a multiple earners in
the household. Income risk is captured by two variables: (i) if the household has a reasonable
idea of what the household’s income will be in the future; and (ii) if the household’s previous
annual income was above or below what was expected.25 Health risk is captured by the
insurance cover of the household, whilst expenditure risk is captured by whether major
financial expenses are expected in the next five years. A full description of these variables is
also given in Table 2.
4.1 Measuring Borrowing Constraints
The key aim of this paper is to explore the impact of borrowing constraints on portfolio
allocation decisions. In the literature more broadly, the term liquidity constrained is used
to refer to households who are credit or borrowing constrained, see for example, Guiso
and Paiella (2008), Le Blanc, Porpiglia, Zhu, and Ziegelmeyer (2015) and Campbell and
Hercowitz (2019). Generally, households are defined to be borrowing constrained if they are
unable to borrow the amount they asked for or they have been charged a higher interest rate
25These measures are similar to those used by Fulford (2015). However, we allow a differential impact
of being above or below a household’s normal income by entering positive and negative values as separate
variables.
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than the ‘market clearing’ interest rate.
Previous studies have exploited a range of constraint measures to test the validity of the
Life-Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis models (see for example, Hall and Mishkin 1982;
Zeldes 1989; and Hayashi 1985). A major limitation of these studies is that constrained
households are identified via indirect evidence, such as the household’s wealth to income
ratio or the household’s saving rate. Subsequent studies have used more direct measures of
such constraints, which are revealed directly from survey questions.
The SCF includes information which enables us to directly observe constrained house-
holds, in line with Jappelli (1990). A full description of these measures is given in Table 3,
whilst the corresponding summary statistics are presented in Table 4. We use information
on whether households have been turned down for credit at a financial institution or if they
did not apply because they believed they would be turned down for credit in order to define
a range of borrowing constraint measures. We incorporate information based on whether the
household did not apply for credit due to a belief they would be turned down, in addition to
actually being turned down for credit, since, as argued in Jappelli (1990), if there is a cost
to apply, this subjective likelihood of being turned down may not apply initially due to the
likelihood they will be refused credit.
Initially, we exploit information on whether the household chose not to apply for credit
based on a belief that it might be rejected (Constraint 1 ). Specifically, this form of constraint
is associated with the response to the question: “Was there any time in the past 12 months
that you thought of applying for credit at a particular place, but changed your mind because
you thought you might be turned down?” We construct a binary variable which assumes a
value of 1 if the response was “yes”, and 0 if “no”. Table 4 shows that 14% of the households
in our sample did not apply for credit in the past 12 months for this reason.
Our second constraint measure (Constraint 2 ) is based on the question: “In the past
twelve months, has a particular lender or creditor turned down any request you (or your
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husband/wife/partner) made for credit, or not given you as much credit as you applied for?”26
Respondents can respond in three ways: Yes, turned down; Yes, not as much credit; or No.
A household is defined to be constrained if they respond either “turned down” or did not
receive as much credit as applied for. Households are not constrained if they respond “no”.
In our sample, 25% are defined to be constrained according to this measure.
Our next measure augments the above with information contained in the following ques-
tion: “Were you later able to obtain the full amount you requested by reapplying to the same
institution or by applying elsewhere?” If a household was subsequently able to obtain the
full amount applied for they are defined as not being constrained in our third borrowing
constraint measure (Constraint 3 ). As presented in Table 4, once we account for households
who were able to obtain credit by reapplying (either at the same institution or else where),
the proportion of constrained households falls to 16%, as compared to Constraint 2.
Finally, in the spirit of Jappelli (1990) we combine the above questions relating to being
turned down and not applying due to a belief of being turned down. Specifically, we construct
binary variables which capture if a household has not obtained credit due to either not
applying for credit or if they have been unsuccessful in their credit application (Constraints
4 and 5 ). The proportions of households defined to be constrained when we account for both
being discouraged and turned down are 29% and 20% for Constraints 4 and 5, respectively.
We restrict our analysis to the sample of households who have made, or thought about
making, a credit application in recent years. We argue that, if a household has not applied
for credit, then we do not observe whether they are constrained or not. This results in a
sample of 27, 618 households across the time period 1995-2019.
26The question changed the time period from 5 years to 12 months in the 2016 and 2019 waves of the
survey. If we restrict our analysis to the consistent questions (i.e. between 1995 and 2013) we find no
differences in the results.
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4.2 Asset Share Distributions
Figure 2 presents the distributions of the dependent variables considered in our analysis, that
is, the ratios of high, medium and low-risk assets to total financial wealth. The distributions
are clearly non-normal suggesting that linear regression is not an appropriate modelling
approach. It is also apparent that there are spikes at various parts of the distribution,
particularly at 0 and 1. Considering the distributions shown in Panel A in Figure 2, it is
clear that approximately 65% of households hold some sort of high-risk asset either directly or
indirectly. The summary statistics presented in Table 4 reveal that households hold around
33% of their financial wealth in high-risk assets, either directly or indirectly, whilst around
41% of financial assets are held in safe assets. Furthermore, the majority of households hold
some form of safe asset (which is not surprising as this asset category includes checking and
current accounts), with only 0.8% of households not holding any safe assets.
5 Empirical Strategy
For the purposes of comparison to the existing literature, we initially consider univariate
models of portfolio allocation, where, in line with the existing literature, a single asset (high-
risk) is the focus. In these specifications, the share of high-risk assets in a household portfolio
is modelled using a univariate fractional response (FRM) (Papke and Wooldridge 1996)
framework.27 For brevity, we do not present the formulations of these standard econometric
techniques. In our setting, given the different underlying assumptions of the FRM approach,
consideration of the FRM serves as a robustness check. We then go on to implement the OF
model, which simultaneously models the three asset categories which have an inherent risk
ordering. This approach is outlined below.
27We also use Tobit analysis (Tobin 1958) to model high-risk asset shares in line with the existing literature.
The coefficients and associated marginal effects are discussed in Appendix F.1. Generally these results are
in line with those for the FRM approach.
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5.1 Ordered fractional model
We are concerned with modeling the household’s financial portfolio, where a household can
allocate their financial assets to three distinct categories based on their risk exposure, namely,
high, medium and low. Our interest lies in modelling the share of the household’s financial
portfolio allocated to each type of financial asset and the partial effects of observed covariates
on these. Consequently, we employ the ordered fractional model of Kawasaki and Lichtenberg
(2014). In our set up, we label the shares j = 0, 1, 2, such that they decrease with risk as
j increases, that is, j = 0 represents the high-risk category, j = 1 represents medium-risk
assets, and j =2 represents the low-risk assets.28
In order to motivate the OF model, it is intuitive to relate it to the standard ordered
probit (OP ) model (Greene 2012). Here, agents are assumed to have an underlying latent
variable, y∗i , related to observed characteristics with unknown weights (β), and a random,
normally distributed error term ui, such that
y∗i = x
′
iβ + ui. (7)
Denoting the total number of outcomes available as J (here J = 3, such that j = 0, 1, 2),
the outcome j that household i chooses will depend on the relationship between y∗i and the
inherent boundary parameters in the OP model (Greene and Hensher 2010), µ, according
28It would be possible to model the effects of drivers on each of the sij shares as a linear system, such
that sij = x
′
iβj + uij , where xi is a matrix of (household) covariates and uij is a random error. This
would effectively be an extension of the linear probability model, the shortcomings of which are well-known
(Gujarati 1995; Gujarati 1995; Gujarati 1995). Indeed, such an approach would not be ideal: it would not
guarantee that 0 ≤ E (sij |xi ) = x′iβj ≤ 1; would have repercussions on ensuring the adding-up constraint
that
∑
j = E (sij |xi ) ≡ 1; it would also be unable to handle boundary observations of 0 or 1 shares; and
would likely embody heteroskedasticity in uij . We have also explored the use of a multi-nominal fractional
response model, see for example, Becker (2014). In this setting, the inherent risk ordering of asset classes
is not accounted for in the estimation strategy, instead the multi-nominal probit model is used as the
















0 if y∗it < µ0
1 if µ0 ≤ y∗it < µ1.
2 if y∗it ≥ µ1
(8)





(Φ [µ0 − x′iβ])
di0 ([Φ (µ1 − x′iβ)− Φ (µ0 − x′iβ)])
di1 (1− Φ (µ1 − x′iβ))
d2 (9)
where Φ (.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The indicator function
dij is such that dij = 1 (yj = j), where unlike an OF model, the household can be in only
one of the j = 0, 1, 2 outcomes. As such, equations (7) and (9) are not sufficient to model
ordered fractional data.
What is required is the effect of covariates on
E (sij |xi ) , j = 0, 1, 2 (10)
where E denotes the expected value of the term in parentheses. Replacing dij = 1 (yj = j)




(Φ [µ0 − x′iβ])
si,j=0 ([Φ (µ1 − x′iβ)− Φ (µ0 − x′iβ)])
si,j=1 (1− Φ (µ1 − x′iβ))
si,j=2 .
(11)
Note that here the OF model is consistent with the inherent ordering, in risk, of the asset
bundles (and not of the value of the shares themselves). This allocation equation is now
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characterised by
E (si,j=0 |xi ) = Φ (µ0 − x′iβ) (12)
E (si,j=1 |xi ) = Φ (µ1 − x′iβ)− Φ (µ0 − x′iβ)
E (si,j=2 |xi ) = 1− Φ (µ1 − x′iβ)
which by construction satisfy 0 ≤ E (si,j |xi ) ≤ 1, and are consistent with the risk ordering of
the j asset bundles in the household’s portfolio. Moreover, boundary observations of zero or
unity shares are also easily dealt with here. Such a model provides a means of modelling the
household’s portfolio allocations, which takes into account the inherent risk ordering of the
asset categories. This empirical strategy mirrors the theoretical setup presented in Section
3.
6 Results
Initially, prior to discussing the results relating to the OF model, we consider the univari-
ate models of high-risk asset holding. As reported earlier, high-risk assets are defined to
include both direct and indirect risky asset holding. In these specifications, we model the
share of high-risk assets, relative to the household’s total financial assets, using a univariate
specification. We then move on to discuss the results relating to the OF model.
6.1 Univariate Model
Table 5 reports the coefficients relating to the FRM model of the proportion of high risk
assets, whilst, Table 6 presents the associated marginal effects. The results are generally
consistent with the existing literature, see for example, Rosen and Wu 2004, Fratantoni
2001, Haliassos and Bertaut 1995, and Bertaut 1998. For example, white headed households
report holding a higher proportion of high-risk assets in their portfolio relative to non-white
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headed households. In addition, the share of high-risk assets is increasing in the level of
education. For example, as presented in Table 6, compared to having below high school
education, possessing a college degree is associated with holding approximately 13% more
high-risk assets, holding all other factors constant. Similarly, having children present in
the household is inversely related to the share of high-risk assets, whilst, households with
retired heads and those who are home owners, hold a higher proportion of high-risk assets,
compared to those who report being out of the labour force. Turning our attention to the
variables which capture the household’s financial position reveal the expected results. Both
household income and household net wealth are positively related to the share of high-risk
assets. For example, according to Table 6, a 1% increase in household income is associated
with an increase in the share of high-risk assets of 0.04%.
The results relating to the head of household’s risk attitudes also show the expected
results. Having a household head with a higher value of the risk attitudes index is associated
with a higher proportion of high-risk assets in the financial portfolio. In addition, households
with heads who report their saving horizons to be further in the future and those who have
a positive economic outlook both hold a higher proportion of high-risk assets.
We now explore the impact of the variables which capture the household’s exposure to
background risk. We find that the head of household knowing their income for the following
year has a positive association with the proportion of high-risk assets held. In addition, we
find that households who have no health insurance cover hold a lower level of high-risk assets,
arguably capturing the household’s potential exposure to health cost uncertainty. Moreover,
the households who expect a major financial expense in the next five years or those who
anticipate a substantial inheritance, hold a higher proportion of high-risk assets.
Turning our attention to the relationship between our borrowing constraint measures and
risky asset holdings reveals that, across all borrowing constraint measures, there exists an
inverse relationship between being constrained and the share of high-risk assets held. For
example, considering the results presented in Table 6, Constraint 5, that is believing that
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they would be turned down or were turned down and did not reapply for credit is associated
with holding a lower level of high-risk assets in the portfolio. Specifically, being constrained
by this measure is associated with a reduction in the share of risky assets by 1.6%. The
magnitudes across all five measures of borrowing constraints are similar, irrespective of how
we define being borrowing constrained or the modelling approach adopted.
6.2 Ordered fractional model
We now discuss the results relating to the OF model, which jointly models the household’s
financial portfolio, that is, the proportion of financial wealth allocated to high, medium and
low-risk asset categories. Table 7 presents the coefficients and the marginal effects for the
OF model. Recall here that a negative coefficient is interpreted as being positively related
to holding a higher proportion of high-risk asset categories, whilst the marginal effects are
interpreted in the usual way.
It is clear from Table 7 that the impact of the standard variables on the household’s
portfolio allocations are generally in accordance with the univariate models. For example,
white headed households hold a higher proportion of high-risk assets, whilst having children
in the household induces households to hold safer portfolios. Specifically, relative to being a
non-white headed household, white headed households hold 4.5% and 0.5% higher high-risk
and medium-risk asset shares, respectively, whilst having a white head of household is asso-
ciated with holding a 5.0% lower low-risk asset share. Similarly, education is strongly related
to the household’s portfolio composition. Relative to having below high school level educa-
tion, having a college education is associated with a 14.7% higher high-risk asset share, and
a 16.2% lower low-risk asset share. Moreover, households with retired heads are associated
with holding a higher proportion of high-risk assets relative to not being in the labour force.
Specifically, retired heads of household are associated with 4.8% and 0.5% higher medium
and high-risk asset shares respectively, as compared to not being in the labour force.
With regards to the head of household’s attitudes towards risk, saving horizons and
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subjective economic expectations, the expected impacts are found. If the head of household
has a positive economic outlook and if the head of household is more risk tolerant, they are
associated with a riskier portfolio allocation. For example, a one-unit increase in the risk
attitudes index is associated with an increase in the shares of high-risk assets by 7.2% and
a reduction in the share of low-risk assets 7.9%.
Considering the impact of the background risk measures reveals that expecting a major
financial expenditure, health insurance cover, inheritance and having income below that
expected in the previous year all have statistically significant impacts on the household’s
portfolio composition. For example, households who do not have health insurance hold,
on average, a safer portfolio than those households who have health insurance cover. For
example, having no health insurance cover is associated with holding a 10.9% higher low-risk
asset share, whilst it is associated with holding 9.9% and 1.0% lower high and medium-risk
asset shares, respectively.
Turning our attention to the borrowing constraint measures reveals broadly similar re-
sults to the univariate specifications, that is, households who are defined to be constrained
hold, on average, a safer financial portfolio. Interestingly, these results reveal that the bor-
rowing constraints, in addition to being associated with a lower share of high-risk assets, are
associated with a reduction in the share of medium-risk assets held. Specifically, across all
measures, constrained households hold a lower proportion of high and medium-risk assets,
and hold a larger proportion of low-risk assets in their financial portfolio, in line with the the-
oretical model presented in Section 3. For example, Constraint 5 is associated with holding
1.3% and 0.1% lower shares of high and medium-risk assets, respectively, and is associated
with holding a 1.5% higher share of low-risk assets. Similar findings are observed for the
other borrowing constraint measures thereby endorsing the robustness of our empirical find-




This paper has contributed to the household finance literature in a number of ways. For
motivation, we developed a tractable theoretical framework with a basis in standard portfolio
theory, which is structured around three tradable assets differentiated by increasing rates of
risk and return. The rationale for the presence of three tradable assets explicitly reflects of
the nature of our empirically observable data, in which household financial wealth is classified
as being either low-risk, medium-risk, or high-risk. Under non-restrictive assumptions the
behavior of the medium-risk asset was found to be ambiguous. Further, the confluence of
correlated background risk and borrowing constraints was found to impact on the domain of
the non-binding risk-return space, which in turn holds implications for the structure of the
household’s optimal portfolio. This suggests that when empirically modelling the impact of
borrowing constraints on household portfolio allocation, it is important to control for the
impact of background risk.
Our empirical findings suggest that households that are defined as being borrowing con-
strained, and further, that are exposed to higher levels of background risk, are inclined to
allocate their financial wealth towards less risky asset categories. This result is important,
given the theoretical ambiguity which we showed characterises the behavior of the medium-
risk asset class. In particular, both our theoretical and empirical modeling approaches re-
veal that borrowing constraints may have significant ramifications for the behavior of the
medium-risk category, and not just assets that are classified as being high-risk. This may be
important, as our sample data suggests that in addition to there being a ‘stockholding puzzle’
– which affects high-risk assets – US households also shun holding medium-risk assets, which
our empirical proxies for borrowing constraints appear to partially explain. Significantly, a
lack of access to borrowing is not only negatively associated with a stockholding, but, the
holding of medium-risk assets. This finding has important public policy implications, which
are potentially more far-reaching for US households than their propensity to shun holding
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stocks. For example, medium-risk assets include retirement funds and life insurance polices.
Non-participation in the markets for these financial products may substantially increase the
likelihood being in poverty in old age, or increase the likelihood of family members suffering
a catastrophic financial shock—such as the inability to maintain mortgage payments—in the
event of early death. In this regard, public policies aimed at ensuring greater household ac-
cess to borrowing and credit may be essential to increasing the uptake of some medium-risk
financial products, which in turn may mitigate the financial impacts of events such as retire-
ment and death across the lifecycle of a household. In this sense, our contribution suggests
that further work directed towards accounting for the allocation of medium-risk assets in US
households should be considered expedient.
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Figure 1: The efficient frontier and household preferences under short-sale constraints, with
(**) and without (*) background risk
Notes: The following parameterisations are used: µL = 2.36, σL = 2.25; µM = 5.43, σM = 4.96; µH = 11.89,
σH = 18.44; µB = 4, λ = 1; γ = 0.5. Orange/red curves capture the absence of background risk (σH = 0).
Light blue/dark blue curves correspond to the case of positively correlated background risk (σB = 5, ρLB =
ρMB = 0, ρHB = 0.4).
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Panel C: Low Risk Assets
Notes: The above figure shows the distributions of the three assets classifications in the SCF.
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Table 1: Optimal portfolio composition predicted by the model under alternative back-
ground risk scenarios
Optimal portfolio composition





No background risk (σB = 0) 0.694 0.268 0.038 5.191
Positive correlation
(ρLB=ρMB=0; ρHB=0.4)
0.726 0.274 0 −6.749
Independent background risk
(ρLB=ρMB=ρHB=0)
0.694 0.268 0.038 −7.309
Negative correlation
(ρLB=ρMB=0; ρHB=−0.4)
0.605 0.249 0.146 −3.917
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Table 2: Variable definitions
Dependent Variables Definition
High-risk
Directly held stocks; Stock mutual funds; Risky retirement accounts; Risky annuities; trust
funds; mortgage bonds; corporate and foreign bonds
Medium-risk Safe retirement funds; State and local bonds; Tax-free bonds; Life insurance policy
Low-risk
Checking and saving accounts; Certificates of deposit; Money market deposit accounts; US
savings bonds; Call accounts
Independent Variables Definition
Age Age of household head in years.
Age Squared Age of household head in years squared divided by 100.
Male = 1 if head of household is male; 0 if female.
White = 1 if the head of household is white, 0 otherwise.
Child = 1 if there are children under the age of 16 present in the household, 0 otherwise.
College = 1 if head of household has college degree as highest educational qualification, 0 otherwise
High school = 1 if head has high school diploma as highest educational qualification, 0 otherwise
Married = 1 if head of household is married or in a relationship, 0 otherwise.
Employed = 1 if head of household reports being employed, 0 otherwise.
Self-Employed = 1 if head of household reports being self-employed, 0 otherwise.
Retired = 1 if head of household reports being retired, 0 otherwise.
Economic Exp.
Over the next five years, do you expect the US economy as a whole to perform better, worse,
or about the same as it has over the past five years? 0 = Worse, 1 = About the same, 2 =
Better.
Saving horizon.
Index based on responses to the question, “In planning or budgeting your (family’s) saving
and spending which period is most important to you? 1 is next few months, 2 next year, 3
next few years, 4 5-10 years, 5 longer than 10 years.
Risk Attitudes
An index, increasing in risk tolerance, based on responses to the question “Which of the
following statements comes closest to describing the amount of financial risk that you are
willing take when you save or make investments? 0 = Not willing to take any financial risks,
1= Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns, 3 = Take above average
financial risks expecting to earn above average returns, 4 = Take substantial financial risks
expecting to earn substantial returns.”
Total Income Natural Logarithm transformation of total household income divided by 10.
Net Wealth
Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of net wealth, that is, total assets minus total debt,
divided by 10.
Homeowner = 1 if the household owns or is buying/land contract on property; 0 otherwise.
Year controls
Dummy variables for the 1995 (omitted), 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2019
years are included.
Background Risk Definition
Own Business =1 if owns business which was not started by the household, 0 otherwise
Multi earner =1 if there are more than one earner in the household, 0 otherwise.
Major Fin. Exp.
=1 if household head reports “Yes” to the question “In the next five to ten years, are there
any foreseeable major expenses that you (and your family) expect to have to pay for (your-
self/yourselves), such as educational expenses, purchase of a new home, health care costs,
support for other family members, or anything else?”
Health Insurance
= 1 if not all individuals in the household are covered by some type of health insurance; 0
otherwise.
Inheritance = 1 if expect inheritance or significant transfer of assets in the next five years, 0 otherwise.
Know Income
=1 if household head has “a good idea of what your (family’s) income for next year will be”,
0 otherwise.
Income Above Norm.
Takes the values of the difference between ”normal” income and previous years income, if
previous years income exceeded ”normal” income.
Income Below Norm.
Takes the values of the difference between ”normal” income and previous years income, if
previous years income was below ”normal” income.
36
Table 3: Borrowing constraint measures
Panel A: The questions used in constructing the borrowing constraint measures
(1): In the past twelve months, has a particular lender or creditor turned down any request you or your (husband/wife/partner)
made for credit, or not given you as much credit as you applied for?
(2): Were you later able to obtain the full amount you requested by reapplying to the same institution or by applying elsewhere?
(3): Was there any time in the past twelve months that you (or your husband/wife/partner) thought of applying for credit at
a particular place, but changed your mind because you thought you might be turned down?
Panel B: Borrowing constraint measures definitions
Constraint 1
= 1 if the household did not apply for credit due to a belief that the application would be
rejected, 0 otherwise
Constraint 2
= 1 if the household responds they were turned down or did not obtain the full amount of
credit applied for, 0 otherwise
Constraint 3
= 1 if the household responds they were turned down or did not obtain the full amount
of credit applied for and they did not reapply or were able to obtain credit elsewhere, 0
otherwise
Constraint 4 = 1 if constraint 1 or constraint 2 are satisfied, 0 otherwise
Constraint 5 = 1 if constraint 1 and constraint 3 is satisfied, 0 otherwise.
The table shows how the borrowing constraint status of the household can be constructed using the information in the SCF.
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Table 4: Summary statistics
Dependent Variables:
Proportion High Risk Assets (Direct and Indirect) 0.333 (0.002)
Proportion Medium Risk Assets 0.258 (0.002)
Proportion Low Risk Assets 0.409 (0.002)
Independent Variables:
Age 48.048 (0.086)




Below High School 0.064 (0.001)
High School 0.407 (0.003)








Economic Exp. 1.157 (0.005)
Saving Horizon 2.183 (0.008)
Risk Attitudes 1.085 (0.005)
Total Income 11.648 (0.009)
Net Worth 9.923 (0.052)
Homeowner 0.671 (0.003)
Background Risks:
Business Own. 0.282 (0.003)
Multi Earners 0.389 (0.003)
Major Fin. Exp. 0.596 (0.003)
No Health insur. 0.083 (0.002)
Inheritance 0.174 (0.002)
Know Income 0.706 (0.003)
Income Above Norm. 1.396 (0.024)
Income Below Norm. -1.746 (0.025)
Borrowing Constraints:
Constraint 1 0.141 (0.002)
Constraint 2 0.254 (0.003)
Constraint 3 0.158 (0.002)
Constraint 4 0.293 (0.003)
Constraint 5 0.197 (0.002)
Observations 27,618
[1] The table shows summary statistics of the variables. [2] Standard er-
rors in parentheses.
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Table 5: Fractional Probit Model - Coefficients
Specification
1 2 3 4 5
Age 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0196∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0196∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Age Squared -0.0174∗∗∗ -0.0172∗∗∗ -0.0172∗∗∗ -0.0173∗∗∗ -0.0173∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Male 0.0500∗∗ 0.0518∗∗ 0.0511∗∗ 0.0512∗∗ 0.0503∗∗
(0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0227) (0.0227)
White 0.1721∗∗∗ 0.1743∗∗∗ 0.1758∗∗∗ 0.1722∗∗∗ 0.1739∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0171)
Education:
High School 0.1962∗∗∗ 0.1973∗∗∗ 0.1970∗∗∗ 0.1965∗∗∗ 0.1962∗∗∗
(0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0338)
College Degree 0.3961∗∗∗ 0.3976∗∗∗ 0.3989∗∗∗ 0.3954∗∗∗ 0.3970∗∗∗
(0.0333) (0.0334) (0.0333) (0.0335) (0.0333)
Married -0.0276 -0.0272 -0.0264 -0.0276 -0.0266
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0224)
Child -0.0381∗∗∗ -0.0384∗∗∗ -0.0392∗∗∗ -0.0377∗∗ -0.0387∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0143)
Employment:
Employed 0.2306∗∗∗ 0.2321∗∗∗ 0.2315∗∗∗ 0.2312∗∗∗ 0.2305∗∗∗
(0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290)
Self-Employed 0.0300 0.0316 0.0309 0.0309 0.0301
(0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0335) (0.0336)
Retired 0.1274∗∗∗ 0.1289∗∗∗ 0.1290∗∗∗ 0.1273∗∗∗ 0.1274∗∗∗
(0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0342) (0.0343)
Economic Exp. 0.0281∗∗∗ 0.0278∗∗∗ 0.0278∗∗∗ 0.0278∗∗∗ 0.0278∗∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083)
Saving Horizon 0.0293∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0293∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Risk Attitudes 0.2323∗∗∗ 0.2324∗∗∗ 0.2319∗∗∗ 0.2326∗∗∗ 0.2320∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Total Income 0.1201∗∗∗ 0.1199∗∗∗ 0.1203∗∗∗ 0.1195∗∗∗ 0.1199∗∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057)
Net Worth 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Home owner 0.1415∗∗∗ 0.1432∗∗∗ 0.1444∗∗∗ 0.1413∗∗∗ 0.1426∗∗∗
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0159) (0.0157)
Background Risks:
Business Own. -0.0158 -0.0154 -0.0158 -0.0154 -0.0159
(0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0163)
Multi Earners 0.0327∗∗ 0.0330∗∗ 0.0332∗∗ 0.0326∗∗ 0.0329∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145)
Major Fin. Exp. 0.0557∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0544∗∗∗ 0.0561∗∗∗ 0.0549∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125)
No Health insur. -0.2119∗∗∗ -0.2134∗∗∗ -0.2142∗∗∗ -0.2110∗∗∗ -0.2120∗∗∗
(0.0280) (0.0281) (0.0280) (0.0282) (0.0281)
Inheritance 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0525∗∗∗ 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0525∗∗∗ 0.0521∗∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144)
Know Income 0.0513∗∗∗ 0.0512∗∗∗ 0.0515∗∗∗ 0.0507∗∗∗ 0.0510∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134)
Income Above Norm. -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Income Below Norm. 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000












Constant -3.7819∗∗∗ -3.7778∗∗∗ -3.7952∗∗∗ -3.7603∗∗∗ -3.7807∗∗∗
(0.0952) (0.0964) (0.0950) (0.0974) (0.0957)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,618 27,618 27,618 27,618 27,618
[1] Dependent variable is the proportion of high risk assets. [2] Fractional probit regression
model parameters [3] Standard errors in parentheses. [4] *denotes significance at the 10% level
**denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 6: Fractional Probit Model - Marginal Effects
Specification
1 2 3 4 5
Age 0.0063*** 0.0062*** 0.0062*** 0.0062*** 0.0062***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Age Squared -0.0055*** -0.0055*** -0.0055*** -0.0055*** -0.0055***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Male 0.0159** 0.0165** 0.0162** 0.0163** 0.016**
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072)
White 0.0547*** 0.0554*** 0.0559*** 0.0547*** 0.0553***
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0054)
Education:
High School 0.0624*** 0.0627*** 0.0626*** 0.0624*** 0.0623***
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0107)
College Degree 0.1258*** 0.1263*** 0.1268*** 0.1256*** 0.1261***
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106)
Married -0.0088 -0.0086 -0.0084 -0.0088 -0.0085
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071)
Child -0.0121*** -0.0122*** -0.0125*** -0.012*** -0.0123***
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Employment:
Employed 0.0733*** 0.0738*** 0.0736*** 0.0735*** 0.0732***
(0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092)
Self-Employed 0.0095 0.01 0.0098 0.0098 0.0096
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0107)
Retired 0.0405*** 0.0409*** 0.041*** 0.0404*** 0.0405***
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109)
Economic Exp. 0.0089*** 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 0.0088***
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Saving Horizon 0.0093*** 0.0093*** 0.0094*** 0.0091*** 0.0093***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Risk Attitudes 0.0738*** 0.0738*** 0.0737*** 0.0739*** 0.0737***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Total Income 0.0382*** 0.0381*** 0.0382*** 0.038*** 0.0381***
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Net Worth 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 0.005*** 0.0051***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Home owner 0.045*** 0.0455*** 0.0459*** 0.0449*** 0.0453***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.0049) (0.005) (0.005)
Background Risks:
Business Own. -0.005 -0.0049 -0.005 -0.0049 -0.005
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052)
Multi Earners 0.0104** 0.0105** 0.0106** 0.0104** 0.0105**
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Major Fin. Exp. 0.0177*** 0.0176*** 0.0173*** 0.0178*** 0.0174***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
No Health insur. -0.0673*** -0.0678*** -0.0681*** -0.067*** -0.0673***
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089)
Inheritance 0.0166*** 0.0167*** 0.0166*** 0.0167*** 0.0166***
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Know Income 0.0163*** 0.0163*** 0.0164*** 0.0161*** 0.0162***
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Income Above Norm. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Income Below Norm. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000












Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,618 27,618 27,618 27,618 27,618
[1] Dependent variable is the proportion of high risk assets. [2] Fractional probit regression model
marginal effects [3] Standard errors in parentheses. [4] *denotes significance at the 10% level
**denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% level.
40
Table 7: Ordered fractional model
Coefficients High-risk Medium-risk Low-risk
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Age -0.0351*** (0.0026) 0.0123*** (0.0009) 0.0013*** (0.0001) -0.0135*** (0.001)
Age Squared 0.0286*** (0.0026) -0.0100*** (0.0009) -0.001*** (0.0001) 0.011*** (0.001)
Male 0.0263 (0.0211) -0.0092 (0.0074) -0.0010 (0.0008) 0.0102 (0.0081)
White -0.1295*** (0.015) 0.0453*** (0.0052) 0.0047*** (0.0006) -0.0500*** (0.0058)
Education
High School -0.2400*** (0.0279) 0.0839*** (0.0098) 0.0088*** (0.0011) -0.0927*** (0.0108)
College Degree -0.4196*** (0.0281) 0.1467*** (0.0098) 0.0154*** (0.0012) -0.1621*** (0.0109)
Married -0.0352* (0.0203) 0.0123* (0.0071) 0.0013* (0.0008) -0.0136* (0.0078)
Child 0.0288** (0.0121) -0.0101** (0.0042) -0.0011** (0.0004) 0.0111** (0.0047)
Employment
Employed -0.2630*** (0.0262) 0.0920*** (0.0091) 0.0096*** (0.0011) -0.1016*** (0.0101)
Self-Employed -0.0160 (0.03) 0.0056 (0.0105) 0.0006 (0.0011) -0.0062 (0.0116)
Retired -0.1370*** (0.0308) 0.0479*** (0.0108) 0.0050*** (0.0012) -0.0529*** (0.0120)
Economic Exp. -0.0183** (0.0071) 0.0064** (0.0025) 0.0007** (0.0003) -0.0071** (0.0027)
Important Period -0.0285*** (0.0045) 0.0100*** (0.0016) 0.0010*** (0.0002) -0.0110*** (0.0017)
Risk Attitudes -0.2046*** (0.0071) 0.0715*** (0.0025) 0.0075*** (0.0004) -0.0790*** (0.0027)
Total Income -0.1287*** (0.0057) 0.0450*** (0.0020) 0.0047*** (0.0003) -0.0497*** (0.0022)
Net Worth -0.0190*** (0.0009) 0.0067*** (0.0003) 0.0007*** (0.0000) -0.0073*** (0.0004)
Home owner -0.1413*** (0.0142) 0.0494*** (0.0050) 0.0052*** (0.0006) -0.0546*** (0.0055)
Background Risk
Business Owner 0.04*** (0.0154) -0.014*** (0.0054) -0.0015*** (0.0006) 0.0155*** (0.006)
Multi Earners -0.0599*** (0.0136) 0.0209*** (0.0048) 0.0022*** (0.0005) -0.0231*** (0.0053)
Major Fin. Exp. -0.0533*** (0.0114) 0.0186*** (0.004) 0.0020*** (0.0004) -0.0206*** (0.0044)
No Health insur. 0.2823*** (0.0246) -0.0987*** (0.0086) -0.0103*** (0.001) 0.109*** (0.0095)
Inheritance -0.0507*** (0.0135) 0.0177*** (0.0047) 0.0019*** (0.0005) -0.0196*** (0.0052)
Know Income -0.0584*** (0.0125) 0.0204*** (0.0044) 0.0021*** (0.0005) -0.0226*** (0.0048)
Income Above Norm. 0.0012 (0.0014) -0.0004 (0.0005) 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0005 (0.0005)
Income Below Norm. -0.0020 (0.0014) 0.0007 (0.0005) 0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0008 (0.0005)
1998 -0.1204*** (0.023) 0.0421*** (0.0081) 0.0044*** (0.0009) -0.0465*** (0.009)
2001 -0.1339*** (0.023) 0.0468*** (0.0081) 0.0049*** (0.0009) -0.0517*** (0.0089)
2004 -0.0171 (0.0222) 0.0060 (0.0078) 0.0006 (0.0008) -0.0066 (0.0087)
2007 -0.0286 (0.0225) 0.0100 (0.0079) 0.0010 (0.0008) -0.0110 (0.0087)
2010 -0.0755*** (0.0213) 0.0264*** (0.0075) 0.0028*** (0.0008) -0.0292*** (0.0082)
2013 -0.0421* (0.0218) 0.0147* (0.0077) 0.0015* (0.0008) -0.0163* (0.0085)
2016 -0.0161 (0.0223) 0.0056 (0.0078) 0.0006 (0.0008) -0.0062 (0.0087)





Constraint 1 0.0318* (0.0189) -0.0111* (0.0066) -0.0012* (0.0007) 0.0123* (0.0073)
Constraint 2 0.0302** (0.0145) -0.0106** (0.0051) -0.0011** (0.0005) 0.0117** (0.0056)
Constraint 3 0.0334* (0.0175) -0.0117* (0.0061) -0.0012* (0.0006) 0.0129* (0.0068)
Constraint 4 0.0358** (0.0144) -0.0125** (0.0051) -0.0013** (0.0005) 0.0138** (0.0056)
Constraint 5 0.0378** (0.0166) -0.0132** (0.0058) -0.0014** (0.0006) 0.0146** (0.0064)
[1] Fractional Ordered Probit Parameters [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] *denotes significance at the 10% level **denotes significance at




A Deriving explicit expressions for the tradable asset shares
Using expression (2) subject to the constraint that qL + qM + qH = 1, Gauss–Jordan elimination can be
applied to demonstrate that the tradable asset shares are given by
qL = α+ βΓ;










and Γ is a scalar that varies over the real line.29 Using the solutions for qL, qM , and qH derived in expression









υL + (1− α− (1 + β)Γ)2 υM + Γ2υH + λ2υB
+2 (α+ βΓ) (1− α− (1 + β)Γ) ρLMσLσM
+2 (α+ βΓ)ΓρLHσLσH + 2 (1− α− (1 + β)Γ) ΓρMHσMσH
+2 (α+ βΓ)λρLBσLσB + 2 (1− α− (1 + β)Γ)λρMBσMσB + 2ΓλρHBσHσB
. (A.3)
Now suppose the household is assumed to specify µW ; by the efficient set theorem it sets out to minimize
the variance of wealth, υW . Differentiating expression (A.3) with respect to Γ and solving for Γ constitutes
a first step in deriving asset share allocations consistent with portfolio variance minimization. This yields
Γ∗ =
{
(1− α)(1 + β)υM − αβυL
+(α− β + 2αβ) ρLMσLσM − αρLHσLσH − (1− α) ρMHσMσH
−λ (βρLBσLσB − (1 + β) ρMBσMσB + ρHBσHσB)
}
{
β2υL + (1 + β)
2υM + υH − 2β(1 + β)ρLMσLσM
+2βρLHσLσH − 2(1 + β)ρMHσMσH
} . (A.4)




H , are given by
q∗L = α+ βΓ
∗;
q∗M = 1− α− (1 + β)Γ∗; and (A.5)
q∗H = Γ
∗.
The efficient frontier, υ∗W , is thus given by
υ∗W =
[













































υM {(µL − µW + λµB) (µL − µH)}
−υL (µW − λµB − µM ) (µM − µH)
+
{
µLµH + µMµH − 2µLµM
+(µW − λµB)(µL + µM − 2µH)
}
ρLMσLσM
−(µW − λµB − µM )(µL − µM )ρLHσLσH
−(µL + λµB − µW )(µL − µM )ρMHσMσH
−λ
{
(µM − µH)(µL − µM )ρLBσLσB
−ρMBσMσB(µL − µH)(µL − µM ) + ρHBσHσB
}
(A.7)
29Deriving (A.1) requires solving a two equation system with three unknowns. As there are an infinite
number of solutions it is necessary to pin down the value of the scalar Γ. It is also possible to specify









υL (µM − µH)2 + υM (µL − µH)2 + υH(µL − µM )2
−2 (µL − µH) (µM − µH) ρLMσLσM
+2 (µM − µH) (µL − µM ) ρLHσLσH
−2(µL − µH)(µL − µM )ρMHσMσH
. (A.8)
Now, for simplicity, assume that the tradable assets are not correlated with each other, and that back-
ground wealth B is correlated with all of the tradable assets L, M and H. Using the results in expressions














S 0 iff υS
υH
T (µS − µM )
2
[
(µS − µH) (µM − µH)− (µM − µH)2
] . (A.10)
It is also straightforward to verify that the condition in expression (A.10) also holds in the presence of
independent background risk when the tradable assets are not correlated with each other. Further, inspection
of expressions (A.2), (A.4), (A.5)–(A.8) indicates that independent background risk will not influence asset
allocations along the efficient frontier.30
As is noted below in Appendix B, the presence of σB in the numerator of Γ
∗ implies that the domain
of the non-binding risk-return space will also be a function of background risk when it is correlated with
the model’s tradable assets. Moreover, from expression (A.4) it is evident that in the presence of correlated
background risk, when the short-sale constraint is not binding, a change in σB will impact on the three
individual asset shares on the efficient frontier. Specifically, we have that:
dq∗L
dσB
= − (µM − µH)




(µM − µH)(µL − µM )ρLBσL
−ρMBσM (µL − µH)(µL − µM ) + ρHBσH
}










(µM − µH)(µL − µM )ρLBσL
−ρMBσM (µL − µH)(µL − µM ) + ρHBσH
}







(µM − µH)(µL − µM )ρLBσL
−ρMBσM (µL − µH)(µL − µM ) + ρHBσH
}
υL (µM − µH)2 + υM (µL − µH)2 + υH(µL − µM )2
, (A.13)





The impact of background risk of a change in asset shares in expressions (A.11)–(A.13), is summarised
in Table A.1, for which we assume that background risk is positively correlated with all respective tradable




HB . For each row, the positive and
negative signs capture the direction of the background risk effect on the derivative dq∗i /dσB , i = L,M,B
of the ρiB , i = L,M,B. For instance, the impact of ρ
+
LB is to reduce the share of low-risk assets in the
household’s portfolio, whereas the impact of ρ+MB and ρ
+
HB is to increase and reduce the share, respectively.
The overall effect on the low-risk asset share dq∗L/dσB is therefore ambiguous, and determined by the values
of µi,σi, i = L,M,B. The presence of negative correlation between B and L, M , and H will be associated
with a reversal of the signs in Table A.1.

30Alternatively, we can express (A.10) as υS (µS − µH) (µM − µH) − υS (µM − µH)2 T υH (µS − µM )2.
Once a household’s optimal portfolio allocation is bound by the no short-sale constraint, this condition will
not hold.
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Table A.1: The impact of background risk on optimal asset allocations when B is positively



















B Conditions under which the non-negativity of q∗L, q
∗
M , and q
∗
H are
satisfied when the short-sale constraint is non-binding
It is possible to use the results in expression (A.5) in Appendix A to determine the conditions under which
q∗L ≥ 0, q∗M ≥ 0, and qH ≥ 0 are jointly satisfied when the short-sale constraint is not binding. From (A.5),
imposing q∗H ≥ 0 is equivalent to the constraint that Γ∗ ≥ 0. For q∗L ≥ 0 we note that α + Γ∗β ≥ 0 can
equivalently be written as Γ∗ ≥ −α
β
. Imposing q∗M ≥ 0 implies that 1− α − (1 + β)Γ∗ ≥ 0, or equivalently,
Γ∗ ≤ (1−α)(1+β) . Together, these results imply that q∗L, q∗M , and q∗H will be positive – that is, the short-sale
constraint will not be binding – when Γ∗ lies in the interval
−α
β
≤ Γ∗ ≤ (1− α)
(1 + β)
where Γ∗ ≥ 0. (B.1)
Drawing on the fact that α = µW−λµB−µM
µL−µM
and β = µM−µH
µL−µM
in Appendix A, means that the condition
in expression (B.1) can be re-expressed in terms of the expected returns, viz.,
µM + λµB − µW
µH − µM
≤ Γ∗ ≤ µL + λµB − µW
µL − µH
where Γ∗ ≥ 0. (B.2)
Condition (B.2) suggests that in the presence of a short-sale constraint, the unconstrained space of returns
and risks available to households satisfying q∗L ≥ 0, q∗M ≥ 0, and q∗H ≥ 0 may be limited. As shown in
Figure 1 of Section 3, this may lead to the no-short-sale constraint becoming binding for households with
low-risk tolerance.31 Moreover, expression (A.7) of Appendix A implies that for the fully correlated model,
the domain of the non-binding risk-return space governed by condition (B.2) will also be a function of
background risk due to the presence of σB in Γ
∗. 
31In our simple static model, borrowing restrictions assume the form of short-selling constraints. However,
in a dynamic setting, Dybvig and Huang (1988) note that imposing a non-negativity constraint (or in fact any
negative lower bound) on wealth is a plausible economic assumption, and admits a natural interpretation as
a credit constraint. Another way is to prevent borrowing from future income. There are many institutional
restrictions on the amount of credit an individual can obtain.
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C The global minimum portfolio and the optimal household port-
folio with mean-variance preferences
C.1 Zero-correlation between assets
The point of tangency between the household’s mean-variance utility function and the efficient frontier in
the risk-return space is obtained by differentiating the efficient frontier υ∗W in expression (A.6) with respect
to µ∗W , setting the resulting expression equal to 1/γ and solving for µ
∗
W . The absence of correlation requires
setting all of the covariance terms in expression (3) to zero prior to the model being differentiated. Given the
mean-variance preferences of the household captured by expression (6), namely G(µW , υW ) = µW − γυW ,
















































and will satisfy the constraint
υ∗W = q
∗2




H υH + λ
2υB . (C.2)




((A− (µM − µH)B) (AC + (µM − µH)D)) υL







(A− (µM − µH)B)2 υS + ((µL − µH)B −A)2 υM + (µL − µM )2 B2υH
] (C.3)
where µtanW denotes the value of µW on the frontier at the point of tangency with expression (6), such that
terms A to E are defined as:
A = υL (µM − µH)2 + υM (µL − µH)2 + υH(µL − µM )2; (C.4)
B = υM (µL − µH) + υL (µM − µH) ; (C.5)
C = −λµB − µM ; (C.6)
D =
(
υM {(µL + λµB) (µL − µH)}




E = µL + λµB . (C.8)




W ), can be obtained by substituting
equation (C.3) into expression (3). The global minimum portfolio is obtained by differentiating the efficient
frontier υ∗W in expression (A.6) with respect to µ
∗
W , setting the resulting expression to zero, and solving
for µ∗W . This yields a solution as in expression (C.3), albeit without the (A(µL − µM ))
2
/2γ term in the
numerator. Finally, from expressions (C.3 )–(C.8) it is evident that under independent background risk µtanW
will be unaffected by change in υB : υB (and by implication
√
υB = σB) is absent from (C.3). 
C.2 Correlated background risk
Now consider the restricted case of the correlated model where background risk is correlated with each of
the tradable assets, but the tradable assets are not correlated with each other,32 so that the equation for the
efficient frontier is given by
υ∗W = q
∗2












32The impact on the efficient frontier when tradable assets are correlated is well explored in the literature.
We therefore refrain from focusing on this area.
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Assuming mean-variance preferences as in expression (6), the point of tangency with the portfolio frontier





























































































((A− (µM − µH)B) (AC + (µM − µH)D)) υL
+((µL − µH)B −A) (AE − (µL − µH)D) υM − (µL − µM )2 BDυH
+(µL − µM )A (A− (µM − µH)B)λρLBσLσB
+(µL − µM )A((µL − µH)B −A)λρMBσMσB










(A− (µM − µH)B)2 υL + ((µL − µH)B −A)2 υM + (µL − µM )2 B2υH
] (C.11)
where µtanW denotes the value of µW on the frontier at the point of tangency in the risk-return space.
Here, we note that the value of µW at the global minimum variance can be obtained by omitting the term
(A(µL − µM ))2 /2γ which appears in the numerator of expression (C.11). Significantly, expression (C.11)
implies that µtanW will be partially determined by the presence of background risk, σB , when it is correlated
with the tradable asset shares. 
D The impact of background risk and risk preferences on µtanW
In the correlated model, the additional presence in expression (C.11) of terms containing σB , namely
(µL − µM )A (A− (µM − µH)B)λρLBσLσB , (D.1)
(µL − µM )A((µL − µH)B −A)λρMBσMσB , (D.2)
and
2 (µL − µM )2 BAλρHBσHσB , (D.3)
implies that the presence of background risk will affect the point of tangency, µtanW . In particular, the sign
and magnitude of the correlation coefficients ρLB , ρMB , and ρHB are central to determining how background
risk, which appears as
√
υB = σB , affects the point of tangency with household preferences. Consider the
impact of correlation between background wealth B and the high-risk tradable asset H, whilst assuming
ρLB = ρMB = 0. For an increase in σB , a negative (positive) value of ρHB , will lead to a fall (rise) in the




2 (µL − µM )2 BAλρHBσH
[
(A− (µM − µH)B)2 υL + ((µL − µH)B −A)2 υM + (µL − µM )2 B2υH
] . (D.4)
Inspection of expression (C.11) also indicates that a change in υB will lead to a change in the value of µW
corresponding to the global minimum variance, µgW . This is unlike the case under independent background
risk, in which the global minimum variance is unaffected by such a change.
For any given expected return in the upward sloping region of the frontier space where µtanW > µ
g
W , the
impact on µtanW of a change in risk aversion γ > 0 will be given by
∂µtanW
∂γ




(A− (µM − µH)B)2 υS
+((µL − µH)B −A)2 υM + (µL − µM )2 B2υH
] . (D.5)
Expression (D.5) says that an increase (decrease) in risk aversion γ will be associated with a decrease
(increase) in the value of µW at the new tangency point. Based on the results implied by the expressions
for ∂q∗i /∂µW , i = L,M,H in (4), the associated increase in µ
∗
W will be associated with a fall (rise) in the
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proportion of high-risk assets held by the household, and a rise (fall) in the proportion of low-risk assets held
at the new point of tangency. However, the impact on q∗M will be ambiguous. We emphasise here that the
change in µtanW implied by expression (D.5) is realised irrespective of whether background risk is assumed to
be correlated with, or independent of, the tradable assets. 
E Short-selling restrictions and Kuhn-Tucker conditions
In the presence of short-selling restrictions, Kuhn-Tucker conditions are used so that the (inequality con-
strained) minimum variance portfolio can be determined. For our minimization problem, we first convert the
problem into a maximization one by multiplying the objective function, υW , by −1. For the fully correlated
model in Appendix A we wish to calculate
max
Γ












υL + (1− α− (1 + β)Γ)2 υM + Γ2υH + λ2υB
+2 (α+ βΓ) (1− α− (1 + β)Γ) ρLMσLσM
+2 (α+ βΓ)ΓρLHσLσH + 2 (1− α− (1 + β)Γ) ΓρMHσMσH
+2 (α+ βΓ)λρLBσLσB + 2 (1− α− (1 + β)Γ)λρMBσMσB
+2ΓλρHBσHσB
(E.1)
whilst ensuring the non-negativity of our assets shares, namely
qL ≥ 0; qM ≥ 0; qH ≥ 0. (E.2)
Using the results in (A.1), it is useful to restate the inequalities in (E.2) as
{
g0(Γ) = α+ Γβ ≥ 0;
g1(Γ) = 1− α− (1 + β)Γ ≥ 0;
Γ ≥ 0.
(E.3)
Forming the Lagrangian gives
L = −υW + φ0 (α+ Γβ + s0) + φ1 (1− α− (1 + β)Γ + s1) (E.4)
which we wish to evaluate subject to
−gi(Γ) + si = 0, i = 0, 1 (E.5)
and the following non-negativity constraints
Γ, s0, s1 ≥ 0. (E.6)
Setting up the Lagrangian, L, thus yields








i = 0, 1. (E.7)
Since Γ, s0 and s1 must be non-negative, the first order conditions on our variable set implies that for a
maximum, the following set of conditions must hold,
∂L
∂Γ ≤ 0 Γ ≥ 0 and Γ∂L∂Γ = 0
∂L
∂si
≤ 0 si ≥ 0 and si ∂L∂si = 0
∂L
∂φi
= 0 i = 0, 1
(E.8)
From expressions (E.7) and (E.8), it follows that if ∂L
∂si
= −φi, then −φi ≤ 0, si ≥ 0 and −φisi = 0, or
equivalently,
φi ≥ 0; si ≥ 0; and φisi = 0. (E.9)
However, the third line of (E.8) − a restatement of the modified constraints in (E.5) − implies that si = gi(Γ).
By substituting the latter into (E.9), means that the second and third lines of (E.8) can be combined to
yield






This enables us to express the first order conditions (E.8) in an equivalent form without dummy variables. Us-
ing the symbol giΓ to denote
∂gi

















gi(Γ) ≥ 0 φi ≥ 0 and φi[gi(Γ)] = 0, i = 0, 1.










α+ Γβ ≥ 0 φ0 ≥ 0 and φ0[α+ Γβ] = 0; (E.12)
1− α− (1 + β)Γ ≥ 0 φ1 ≥ 0 and φ1[1− α− (1 + β)Γ] = 0.










α+ Γβ ≥ 0 φ0 ≥ 0 and φ0[α+ Γβ] = 0; (E.13)
1− α− (1 + β)Γ ≥ 0 φ1 ≥ 0 and φ1[1− α− (1 + β)Γ] = 0.

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F Tobit Results: Coefficients and Marginal Effects
Table F.1: Tobit mode: High risk asset share - Coefficients
Specification
1 2 3 4 5
Age 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0100∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Age Squared -0.0091∗∗∗ -0.0090∗∗∗ -0.0090∗∗∗ -0.0091∗∗∗ -0.0091∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Male 0.0157 0.0168∗ 0.0162∗ 0.0164∗ 0.0158
(0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097)
White 0.0877∗∗∗ 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.0876∗∗∗ 0.0881∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074)
Education:
High School 0.1173∗∗∗ 0.1178∗∗∗ 0.1175∗∗∗ 0.1175∗∗∗ 0.1171∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136)
College Degree 0.2206∗∗∗ 0.2212∗∗∗ 0.2216∗∗∗ 0.2200∗∗∗ 0.2206∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0133)
Married -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0008
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098)
Child -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0244∗∗∗ -0.0248∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗ -0.0244∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063)
Employment:
Employed 0.1317∗∗∗ 0.1325∗∗∗ 0.1320∗∗∗ 0.1320∗∗∗ 0.1313∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Self-Employed 0.0274∗ 0.0283∗∗ 0.0277∗ 0.0278∗ 0.0272∗
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142)
Retired 0.0794∗∗∗ 0.0801∗∗∗ 0.0799∗∗∗ 0.0792∗∗∗ 0.0789∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151)
Economic Exp. 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Saving Horizon 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Risk Attitudes 0.1111∗∗∗ 0.1112∗∗∗ 0.1109∗∗∗ 0.1113∗∗∗ 0.1110∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Total Income 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0606∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Net Worth 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Home owner 0.0790∗∗∗ 0.0798∗∗∗ 0.0800∗∗∗ 0.0786∗∗∗ 0.0790∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0068)
Background Risks:
Business Own. -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.0045
(0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080)
Multi Earners 0.0273∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗∗ 0.0273∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Major Fin. Exp. 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗ 0.0317∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗ 0.0320∗∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056)
No Health insur. -0.1217∗∗∗ -0.1224∗∗∗ -0.1224∗∗∗ -0.1211∗∗∗ -0.1211∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Inheritance 0.0284∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0284∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070)
Know Income 0.0329∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060)
Income Above Norm. 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Income Below Norm. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000












Constant -1.4759∗∗∗ -1.4714∗∗∗ -1.4781∗∗∗ -1.4620∗∗∗ -1.4704∗∗∗
(0.0413) (0.0416) (0.0411) (0.0419) (0.0413)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,618 27,618 27,618 27,618 27,618
[1] Tobit regression marginal effects. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] *denotes significance
at the 10% level **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1%
level.
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Table F.2: Tobit model: High risk asset share - Marginal effects
Specification
1 2 3 4 5
Age 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Age Squared -0.0062∗∗∗ -0.0062∗∗∗ -0.0062∗∗∗ -0.0062∗∗∗ -0.0062∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Male 0.0107 0.0114∗ 0.0111∗ 0.0112∗ 0.0107
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066)
White 0.0598∗∗∗ 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0050)
Education:
High School 0.0800∗∗∗ 0.0804∗∗∗ 0.0802∗∗∗ 0.0801∗∗∗ 0.0799∗∗∗
(0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093)
College Degree 0.1505∗∗∗ 0.1509∗∗∗ 0.1511∗∗∗ 0.1501∗∗∗ 0.1504∗∗∗
(0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0091)
Married -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0006
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Child -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0169∗∗∗ -0.0164∗∗∗ -0.0167∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Employment:
Employed 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.0904∗∗∗ 0.0900∗∗∗ 0.0900∗∗∗ 0.0896∗∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081)
Self-Employed 0.0187∗ 0.0193∗∗ 0.0189∗ 0.0190∗ 0.0185∗
(0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097)
Retired 0.0542∗∗∗ 0.0547∗∗∗ 0.0545∗∗∗ 0.0540∗∗∗ 0.0538∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Economic Exp. 0.0091∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Saving Horizon 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Risk Attitudes 0.0758∗∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗ 0.0757∗∗∗ 0.0759∗∗∗ 0.0757∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Total Income 0.0416∗∗∗ 0.0415∗∗∗ 0.0416∗∗∗ 0.0414∗∗∗ 0.0415∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Net Worth 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Home owner 0.0539∗∗∗ 0.0544∗∗∗ 0.0546∗∗∗ 0.0536∗∗∗ 0.0539∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0046)
Background Risks:
Business Own. -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0030
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054)
Multi Earners 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0186∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Major Fin. Exp. 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗ 0.0218∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038)
No Health insur. -0.0830∗∗∗ -0.0835∗∗∗ -0.0835∗∗∗ -0.0826∗∗∗ -0.0826∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Inheritance 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Know Income 0.0224∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗ 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Income Above Norm. 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Income Below Norm. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000












Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,618 27,618 27,618 27,618 27,618
[1] Tobit regression marginal effects [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] *denotes significance
at the 10% level **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1%
level.
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